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Mayes and Poston: RECENT CASES

RECENT CASES
LANDLOED AND TENANTM-Renewal or Extension of
Lease as Extending Time for Exercise of Option to Purchase
'Contained Therein.-The defendant leased to the plaintiff's
assignor a certain piece of land for the term of three years.
The lease provided for a tenancy of 23 years at a fixed
monthly rental. It further provided that the lessee "shall
have the option to renew said lease for a like term, at an increase of twenty-five percent (25%) in the rent, upon sixty
(60) days notice, prior to the termination of this agreement."
Then in a subsequent paragraph, an option to purchase the
demised premise was given to the lessee "during the term
of this agreement." The lease was renewed at the date of its
expiration for another term of three years, at the higher
rent. Thereafter the plaintiff gave written notice to the defendants that he wished to exercise his option to purchase the
property. The defendants refused to convey, and the plaintiff
filed suit for specific performance. Held, where a lease with a
right of renewal contains an option to purchase, it will be considered as an indivisible contract and unless otherwise limited,
the lessee's option may be exercised during the period of re,
newal or extension. Moore v. Maes, et al., ___ S. C....
52 S. E. (2d) 204 (1949).
This case raises a novel point in South Carolina, a point
that has produced wide controversy in other jurisdictions.
The majority rule is that a provision for the extension of a
lease extends an option to purchase contained therein. e.g.,
Schaeffer v. Bilger, 186 Md. 1, 45 A. (2d) 7751 The question
depends upon the intention of the parties to be gathered from
the lease itself. However, many decisions turn upon the narrow question whether the lease is to be extended or whether
the term is to be extended, or whether the words used indicate that a new lease *is to be executed. See: Sciaeffer
v. Bilger, supra. The English cases follow the line that
the contract is divisible. Where a lease, containing an
option to purchase "during th& three years hereby provided for", was endorsed in its back to the effect that "this
1. See also 163 A. L. R. 706 (1946); 32 Am. Jur., Sec. 308, p. 285.
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lease be extended for three years", the court held that only
the relation of landlord and tenant, that is the tenancy, was
extended and not the option. The court further held that
to extend the lease meant to extend the term not the actual
lease. e.g., Sherwood v. Tucker, 2 Ch. 440 (1924). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed this line of reasoning in a
case where the lessee was given "the privilege of renewing
the lease. . . , under the same terms and conditions as herein
covenanted," and "the right to purchase the property herein
described at any time during the term of this lease." The
court held that the privilege of renewal relates only to the
continuance of the tenancy, not the option, and further that
the renewal of the lease was a leasing again, not an extension
of the original. Pettit v. Tourison, 283 Pa. 529, 129 A. 587
(1925). In a well reasoned case to the contrary, a lease, with
an option to purchase on or before the expiration of the lease
and the privilege of renewal for four additional terms, was
held to have not expired after four renewals, and the lessee
was alowed to exercise the option. Johnson v. Bates, 128 N. J.
Eq. 183, 15 A. (2d) 643 (1940). Another lease containing an
option and the right of renewal, "all other conditions to be the
same", was held to have given the right to renew both the
term and the option. Volunteers of America v. Spring, 27
Ohio App. 229, 161 N. E. 215 (1927). The Pennsylvania
Court has, contrary to the technical definitions of Pettit v.
Tourison, supra, held that the term "lease" is commonly used
as including something more than the mere legal act by which
a tenancy is created, and embraces what are described as
the covenants of the lease. Goldberg v. Grossman, --- Pa.....
160 A. 138 (1932). The same court holds that the word "renewal" as applied to leases has no legal or technical signification. Rosenblum v. Lurie, 128 Pa. Super. 480. "Renewal"
and "extension" as used in leases with reference to options
are synonymous. Economy Stores v. Moran, 178 Miss. 62,
172 So. 865.
. South Carolina has followed what is apparently the better
rule, supported by a majority of the courts. The courts that
refuse to follow this rule rely upon technical definitions of
the words "lease" and "renewal", where the meaning should
be determined by the intentions of the parties. The courts
must consider these words in the light of intentions of the
parties, and this is often best determined by an examina-
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tion of the consideration and other provisions in the lease.
It would not seem unjust to permit a person who leases property and insists upon the right to purchase to be allowed
to exercise that option at any time during the tenancy, in
the absence of any express limitations to the contrary.
MARSHALL T. MAYS

CONTRACTS - Defenses-Impossibility-Fortuitous Destruction of Subject Matter.-Defendant contracted to sell
plaintiff peas of a certain kind and grade to be harvested
from a locality contemplated by both parties. Before the peas
could be harvested and delivered, all peas of the specified
kind and grade in the comtemplated locality were destroyed
by torrential rains. In action by plaintiff for damages for
breach of contract, defendant pleaded act of God as defense.
Held, destruction of the subject matter of the contract by
an act of God vitiated the contract. Pearce-Young-Angel Co.
v. Charles R. Allen C6., 213 S. C. 578, 50 S. E. (2d) 698
(1948).
The early case of Paradinev. Jane, 26 Aleyn (1647), is
still cited as an expression of the general rule that impossibility arising subsequent to the formation of the contract does
not excuse performance on the part of the promisor. Stagg v.
Spray Water Power & Land Co., 171 N. C. 583, 89 S. E. 54
(1916). But the rigor of this rule, with its inevitable hardships, has been somewhat relieved by certain well recognized
exceptions. See: Dermott, Executor v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1 (U. S.
1864); Middlesex Water Co. v. Knappmrann Whiting Co.,
64 N. J. L. 240, 45 A. 692 (1900). It is now well settled that
the destruction of the subject matter without the fault of
either party, where performance of the contract depends on
the continued existence of such subject matter, will excuse
performance, in the absence of a warranty that it shall continue to exist. Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best. & S. 826 (1863) ;
Paddock v. Mason, 187 Va. 809, 48 S. E. (2d) 199 (1948).
The theory on which some courts base their decisions, excusing nonperformance when the subject matter is destroyed,
is that a condition was implied that the subject matter would
continue to exist or that if the subject matter was destroyed,
performance would be excused. e.g., Leonard v. Autocar Sales
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and Service Co., 392 Ill. 182, 64 N. E. (2d) 477 (1945) ; Senters v. Elkhorn and Jellico Coal Co., 284 Ky. 667, 145 S. W.
(2d) 848 (1940). This condition is said to be implied in spite
of the unqualified character of the promissory words. See
Dow v. State Bank, 88 Minn. 355, 93 N. W. 121 (1903).
Other courts have regarded the destruction of the subject
matter contemplated by both parties as a mutual mistake
relieving the parties from performance. E.g., Pengra v.
Wheeler, 24 Ore. 532, 34 Pac. 354 (1893). The rule of implied conditions has been extended to cases where the t~tal
supply of the subject matter, or all of the subject matter of
a contemplated locality, has been destroyed. Browne v. U. S.,
30 Ct. Cl. 124 (1895). Further application of the rule of implied conditions excusing nonperformance due to the destruction of specific subject matter of the contract can be seen
in Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62 (1871), in which it was
held that the seller of specific bales of cotton, which, before
title had passed, were accidentally destroyed by fire without
the seller's fault, was not liable to the purchaser for nonperformance of the contract to sell and deliver the cotton.
And in Matousek v. Galigan, 104 Neb. 731, 178 N. W. 510
(1918), it was held that the nonperformance by the seller
of a contract to deliver specific hay was excused, where the
contract referred to specific subject matter which was destroyed by storms and unusual rains.
It appears that this question of novel impression in South
Carolina has been decided in accord with the view followed
by the vast majority of courts in other jurisdictions which
have modified many of the hard and fast rules of the common law affecting contracts. Rigid rules affecting liability
of contracting parties have been relaxed to more nearly approach equitable considerations. The obligations imposed are
more commensurate with the intentions, surroundings and
capabilities of the contracting parties.
MARVIN B. POSTON
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